Will Pak Really cooperate on Terror? Answer Is No

'Non-state actors' call the shots in Pakistan :

Pakistani Army General The Biggest Terrorist>>>>>>>>>>>>

The rather clumsy attempts by Pakistani security agencies to cover up the origins and links of the terrorists responsible for the Mumbai carnage are a clear sign of the lack of sincerity and seriousness with which Pakistan will crack down on the terror networks operating in that country. Demands by Pakistani authorities for sharing evidence, while legally and diplomatically correct, are little more than a diversionary tactic. Within hours of the Mumbai attack the dirty tricks department of Pakistani intelligence agencies would have got a fix on the perpetrators of the attack and have all the information needed to prosecute and punish those responsible for the outrage. And yet it took a UN ban for Pakistan to crack down on the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, and that too very softly, almost apologetically.

Pakistanis are being disingenuous when they compare Mumbai with Marriott. The Islamists who blasted the Marriott hotel are waging an al Qaeda/Taliban-inspired war on Pakistan. The Mumbai attackers, on the other hand, belong to an Islamist organisation that has been and remains a close ally and instrument of the Pakistan army against India. But more than the fraternal links between the Pakistan army and jihadist militias, it is the changed power equation between the state and non-state actors in Pakistan that will block all attempts to dismantle and destroy the jihadist infrastructure. The Pakistani state has neither the capacity nor the capability, and even less the commitment, to eradicate the non-state terror machine thriving in that country.

The real state within the state in Pakistan is not the ISI or the 'ISI within the ISI' but the jihadist network in Pakistan's hinterland, Punjab. The so-called non-state actors, with the help of elements within the state structure, are today as powerful and influential as the Pakistani state. So much so that anything more than a cosmetic clampdown on the jihadists will invite a reaction so severe that the state might not be able to withstand it. So, in all likelihood, the formal government in Pakistan will probably request the informal government to lie low and let the storm pass before the latter can re-emerge in a new incarnation. The charade will finally end when the non-state actors become the state.

Even though Pakistan is under intense pressure, the seriousness of Pakistan's political leaders to tackle terrorism is still not evident. While Pakistan is faced with difficult choices, the political will is clearly missing. There are fundamental reasons to believe that the cooperation is more likely to be posturing in the hope that the pressures will fizzle out over a period of time.

Whatever action Pakistan has taken so far, it has also made it clear that this action is not due to the pressures from India. No government in Pakistan can be seen to be succumbing to its traditional rival. To what extent Pakistan is going to cooperate, will also be dependent on what the expectations of the international community are. If it is to clamp down on some terrorist groups, there can be the pretence of doing that. If it is to hand over a few terrorists and fugitives, they might also agree to that. But if it is to permanently dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism in Pakistan, as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has demanded, then it cannot be. For, unfortunately the Pakistani ruling elite, including the army, is in no position to do that.


The foundations of the terrorist infrastructure are so deep-rooted that it would require years of political and social engineering to make a dent on it. A political culture of violence, spawned by an intolerant interpretation of Islam and a distorted view of history, lies at the foundation of this terrorist infrastructure. Opportunistic use of religion and politics by successive governments and political groups has created a state that is no longer in control of society. The "non-state actors", which the Pakistani establishment created to pursue its strategic objectives in Afghanistan and India, have gained their own dynamism and autonomy. It will be impossible to excise them without Pakistan itself undergoing serious destabilisation.

But Pakistan is also vulnerable; it can be made to act under pressure. To make Pakistan cooperate in the fight against terrorism, whether through persuasion or coercion, is going to be a long haul. It has to be seen whether India has a creative strategy and the resilience to carry it through.